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ABSTRACT 
BERKELEY AND THE MIND OF GOD 
by 
Craig Knepley 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Professor Margaret Atherton 
 
I tackle a troubling question of interpretation: Does Berkeley's God feel pain? Berkeley's 
anti-skepticism seems to bar him from saying that God does not feel pain, for this would 
mean there is something to reality 'beyond' the perceptible. Yet Berkeley's concerns for 
commonsense and orthodoxy bar him from saying that God does have an idea of pain. 
For Berkeley to have an idea of pain just is to suffer it, and an immutable God cannot 
suffer. Thus solving the pain problem requires answers to further questions: What are 
God's perceptions, for Berkeley? What are God's acts of will? How are the two related 
and how is God's mind related to humans' as a result?  
I argue that Berkeley's God does not feel pain by way of answering these 
questions. I also argue that saying so leaves Berkeley saddled with neither skepticism nor 
heterodoxy. Berkeley is able to preserve God's immutability, God's personality, and 
reality's not lying across some 'veil of perception.'  
Berkeley can dissolve the pain problem since God does not perceive passively as 
we do. What it means to say God 'perceives' is just that God's acts of will are intentional. 
Yet neither God nor reality is thereby placed across some skeptical chasm. God's acts of 
will contain their content in virtue of and are of necessity made manifest in each human 
being's perceptions. The 'real world' is our world: the contents of God's mind are simply 
made plain to human beings by way of their experience of the laws of nature. God does 
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not occupy the same perspective with respect to God's own mind, however: God is "a 
being purely active." By way of understanding the laws of nature as a language, Berkeley 
renders God more personal than other conceptions we might call to mind. Thus 
Berkeley's God is not a blind 'force of nature,' despite God's not feeling pain. God is 
rather a personal mind which continuously communicates with humans by way of 
symbols, namely human perceptions. Insofar as human beings are passive, this is the 
way with which we must be communicated.  
 The cost to my interpretation is that Berkeley cannot literally vindicate the 
utterances of "the vulgar": talk of God's feeling pain, delighting in righteousness or 
grieving over wickedness is at best metaphorical and at worst misleading. Strictly 
speaking the only contents of God's mind are God's perceptions and God's acts of will, 
and neither class of contents contains such feelings. 
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A philosopher, however, should abstain from metaphor. 
–George Berkeley, De Motu §3 
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PART ONE – THE MIND OF GOD 
 
Section One: Berkeley, God, and the Problem of Pain 
George Berkeley is an idealist: he believes the world is mind-dependent, there are 
only minds and ideas, and for objects “to be is to be perceived.”1 Objects human beings 
do not perceive continue to exist because God perceives them. In this paper I focus on 
the issue of whether or not for Berkeley God feels pain. In his concern to preserve 
orthodoxy Berkeley “positively denies” that God feels pain.2 It is unclear however how to 
square this denial with Berkeley’s idealism. For instance, Berkeley argues that we can 
infer God’s existence from the fact that we encounter ideas we do not will ourselves to 
have. Since only minds and ideas exist, and only minds cause ideas, then involuntary 
ideas must be caused by some other mind, and most of the time this mind is God’s.3 Yet 
if God causes our idea of pain, then according to Berkeley God must have an idea of pain. 
If God has an idea of pain however, God must feel pain, and this because of Berkeley’s 
analysis of pain. There is an apparent tension then, between Berkeley’s idealist 
commitments and his insistence that God does not feel pain. Indeed, we seem perched 
on the precipice of a dilemma: if Berkeley cannot deny that God feels pain he falls into 
heterodoxy; if Berkeley does deny that God feels pain he sets up a distance between our 
ideas and God’s, opening the door to a skepticism which threatens to undermine the 
motivation for his project.  
Here I answer the following question: Is there a way for Berkeley to deny that 
God feels pain without engendering skepticism or endorsing heterodoxy? My answer is 
yes, but at some cost: I will show that Berkeley’s God does not 'feel' in a way which would 
                                                        
1 PHK §3. 
2 DHP §240. 
3 Why must it be God's mind as opposed to someone else's? Berkeley is more than comfortable 
saying other (finite) minds cause some of our involuntary ideas. But most of our involuntary ideas 
(especially those of sense) exhibit inordinate complexity and lawlike behavior, and so justify an 
inference to a mind much greater than our own. 
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license the utterances of “the vulgar.” 
In Section Two I examine the pain problem and interpret Berkeley on the nature 
of God’s perception. I outline the relationship between the pain problem and the spectre 
of skepticism, and highlight the importance of getting clear on the nature of Berkeley’s 
God, in particular the relationship between God’s perception and will. I present Kenneth 
Winkler’s denial of blind agency thesis: the denial of the view that God can will a thing 
without an perception of it (act 'blindly'). I examine the implications of the denial of 
blind agency thesis (DBA) for the relationship between God’s perception and God’s will. 
In Section IV I defend the thesis against criticism. I then employ Winkler’s view in 
returning to the pain problem and the spectre of skepticism. I argue that with DBA in 
hand, Berkeley indeed has a response to the pain problem, although it is not one he 
explicitly endorses. God does not feel pain because God does not perceive–not in the way 
we do. God’s 'perceptions' are the intentional contents of God’s acts of will; God 
'perceives' pain only insofar as God wills that human beings perceive pain. My solution 
does not fall prey to the skeptical worry because for Berkeley the standard of reality is 
not what God perceives but what we perceive. In this way the initial assumption driving 
the worry is undermined; if the pain problem is still a problem, it is not a problem due to 
Berkeley’s idealism.   
In Part Two I examine the nature of God's will. I argue that for Berkeley God's 
acts of will are the laws of nature, and the laws of nature are such that God is the cause of 
the apparent motive and causal interaction among bodies. Thus our individual 
perceptions–perhaps especially "the laws of pain and pleasure"4–are God's means of 
symbolic communication with human minds. What is communicated are facts 
concerning one's flourishing. In just this sense the laws of nature constitute God's 
"language."   
                                                        
4 PHK §146. 
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As a result God does not feel pain, but saying so does not land Berkeley in 
skepticism or heterodoxy; on the contrary, he renders God more personal than other 
conceptions we might call to mind. Berkeley can dissolve the pain problem, since God 
does not perceive passively as we do. What it means to say God 'perceives' is just that 
God's acts of will are intentional. Yet neither God nor reality is thereby placed across 
some skeptical chasm. God's acts of will contain their content in virtue of and are 
necessarily made manifest in each human being's perceptions. The 'real world' is our 
world: the contents of God's mind are simply made plain to human beings by way of 
their experience of the laws of nature. God does not occupy the same perspective with 
respect to God's own mind: God is "a being purely active." Thus God is not an impersonal 
'force of nature,' but a personal mind which actively communicates with humans by way 
of symbols, namely human perceptions. Insofar as human beings are passive, this is the 
way with which they must be communicated. 
 In Part Three I reveal the cost of my interpretation: Berkeley cannot literally 
vindicate the utterances of "the vulgar": talk of God's feeling pain, delighting in 
righteousness or grieving over wickedness is at best metaphorical and at worst 
misleading. Strictly speaking the only contents of God's mind are God's perceptions and 
God's acts of will, and neither class of contents contains such attitudes. 
 
Section Two: Pain and the Spectre of Skepticism 
 In Principles 26 Berkeley presents the passivity argument for God’s existence: 
 
We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are 
changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas 
whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause 
cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding 
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section. It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no 
corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an 
incorporeal active substance or spirit (my emphasis). 
 
The argument runs roughly as follows: 
 
 Premise 1: Every idea is caused by some mind. 
 Premise 2: My idea of pain (for example) is not caused by my mind. 
Premise 3: If my idea of pain is not caused by my mind then it is caused either by another 
finite mind or by God. 
 Premise 4: Not all my pains are caused by a finite mind. 
Premise 5: Thus some of my pains are caused by God. 
 Premise 6: If some of my pains are caused by God, then God exists. 
 
Why must it be God's mind as opposed to someone else's? Berkeley is more than 
comfortable saying other finite minds cause some of our involuntary ideas. But most of 
our involuntary ideas (especially those of sense) exhibit inordinate complexity and 
lawlike behavior, and so justify an inference to a mind much greater than our own.  
Naturally, a consequence of the above argument is that God has an idea of pain. 
But for Berkeley pain is a sensation: there is no intentionality or 'aboutness' to pain, we 
simply feel it.5 Unlike our perception of a chair, which we take to be distinct from the 
chair itself, our idea of pain just is the pain. To have an idea of pain is to feel pain. Either 
God has an idea of pain with which to cause our pains (in which case God feels pain), or 
God does not have an idea of pain (but cannot be the cause of our pains). 
 When Hylas presents this point to Berkeley’s mouthpiece, Philonous, in the 
                                                        
5 A point made in Melissa Frankel, “Berkeley and God in the Quad,” Philosophy Compass 7 
(2012): 391. 
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Dialogues, Philonous gives a lengthy series of replies: 
 
That God knows... what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what it 
is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But that God, though He 
knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I 
positively deny. We who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to 
impressions of sense… which being produced against our wills, are sometimes 
painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives 
nothing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and independent… can suffer 
nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at 
all. We are chained to a body... our perceptions are connected with corporeal 
motions. By the law of our nature we are affected upon every alteration in the 
nervous parts of our sensible body: which... is nothing but a complexion of… 
ideas... But God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy or natural 
ties. No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in 
His mind. To know everything knowable is certainly a perfection; but to endure, 
or suffer, or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees 
to God, but not the latter.6 
 
The first reply Berkeley gives is to draw a distinction between intellectual knowledge and 
experiential knowledge. In the same way I might know what the color red is without ever 
having seen it (I might know what wavelengths constitute the color), God can know what 
pain is without ever having felt it. Yet this reply generates a new problem: reconciling 
God’s omniscience with the fact that we seem to know something God does not–how 
pain feels. Berkeley perhaps is aware of this, and so continues to offer distinct replies. 
The second reply to the pain problem is to say that finite minds are both passive and 
                                                        
6 DHP §240-241. 
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active while the infinite mind is only active. This looks like a stronger response, although 
without further explanation it amounts to no more than insisting that God does not feel 
pain. The third response Berkeley gives is to note that our pain is “connected with 
corporeal motions.” God is incorporeal, so God does not feel pain. Similarly, “[God’s] 
ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense.” Here Berkeley creates a distance between our 
ideas and God’s. This distance is further emphasized later in the Dialogues, where 
Berkeley acknowledges 
 
a twofold state of things, the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and 
eternal. The former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the 
mind of God.7 
 
In drawing a thick line between the contents of God’s mind and the contents of our own 
Berkeley now seems to have given up on his project to render our access to reality direct. 
He seems no better off than the Lockean who concedes that we perceive the world only 
mediately. Berkeley’s God has taken the place of matter. 
 Berkeley’s explicit responses to the pain problem are inadequate. More troubling, 
his third reply raises the spectre of skepticism. The most promising route looks to be that 
on which God is “a being purely active.” Yet more needs to be said about just what this 
means if such a reply is to succeed. 
 
Section Three: Denying Blind Agency 
 For Kenneth Winkler, traditional interpretations of Berkeley’s God’s perception 
are defective. He endorses a blend of these interpretations, arguing that their strengths 
can be joined and weaknesses overcome. For Winkler, Berkeley’s God keeps objects in 
                                                        
7 DHP §254. 
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existence by perceiving them, yet statements about unperceived objects are only 
statements about the actual and possible perceptions of finite minds. He argues that 
these two claims are consistent and that their consistency is guaranteed by the nature of 
God's will, specifically that it cannot occur “blindly,” or without accompanying 
perceptions.8  
 The first of the two traditional interpretations Winkler considers is the 
perception interpretation.9 Roughly, the perception interpretation states that 
unperceived objects continue to exist because they are perceived by God.10 A concern, 
though, is that if the perception interpretation is correct then God is diminished. When 
we perceive, more often than not we perceive via the senses, and sense perception is 
marked by being involuntary. When we sense we are acted upon 'from the outside,' and 
this represents an imperfection. Because God cannot suffer imperfection, the perception 
interpretation seems false.11 Still, Berkeley understands perception such that every 
operation of the understanding (versus act of will) is a 'perception,' and thus it is open to 
God to perceive those objects we do not in some non-sensory way.  
 The second interpretation Winkler considers is the phenomenalist 
interpretation.12 According to the phenomenalist interpretation, to say that an object 
exists when none of us perceives it is to say something about the perceptions we would 
have if we turned our attention in a certain direction.13 This interpretation is supported 
by passages like the following from the Principles: 
 
The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my 
                                                        
8 Kenneth Winkler, “Unperceived Objects and Berkeleys Denial of Blind Agency,” Hermathena 
139 (1985) 81. 
9 Winkler 82. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Winkler 83. 
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study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might 
perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.14 
  
A unique feature of the phenomenalist interpretation is that in Winkler’s words “it 
dispenses with natural objects without putting anything in their place.”15 On the 
phenomenalist interpretation natural objects like tables are no longer identified with 
ideas–mine or God’s. Rather, tables are not strictly speaking 'objects' at all: statements 
about them are true in virtue of the relations that obtain between actual and possible 
perceptions, not in virtue of the fact that the term 'table' has for its referent some 
discrete object in the world.  
 It is worth briefly noting how God functions differently in Berkeley’s schema 
depending on which of these two interpretations we adopt. I will pay closer attention to 
just how we are to make sense of God’s role in this schema later. For now it suffices to 
simply point out how the interpretations differ. On the perception interpretation primary 
importance is given to God’s perception: God's perceiving causes a thing's existence.16 On 
the phenomenalist interpretation primary importance is given to God’s will: God’s 
decrees sustain the order and regularity of our perceptions, as well as the relations that 
obtain between them. In this way God’s will determines what can truthfully be said about 
what we commonly call 'objects.'17  
 Winkler’s goal is to synthesize the two interpretations: on his view they are not 
mutually exclusive. He argues that Berkeley assumed “the denial of blind agency” in the 
Principles and the Dialogues.18 That is, Berkeley denied the view that God can will a 
thing without an accompanying perception of that thing (i.e., act “blindly”). Much of 
                                                        
14 PHK §3. 
15 Winkler 83. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Winkler 84. 
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Winkler’s evidence for this second claim is historical. Descartes, Malebranche and Locke 
unanimously denied blind agency, and there are numerous and explicit indications in 
Berkeley’s notebooks that at least at the time he was reading them he agreed.19 The 
question is whether he changed his views.  
 The most compelling reason to think Berkeley’s denial of blind agency continued 
into the Principles and the Dialogues is that the denial of blind agency (DBA) helps us 
make sense of Berkeley’s arguments for the existence of God, his view of what it is to 
exist, and his views on the nature of God’s ideas. For instance, Jonathan Bennett argues 
that Berkeley makes an equivocation in the so-called “continuity argument” for God’s 
existence: 
 
Berkeley takes the premiss that some ideas are independent of (not caused by) 
my mind, muddles himself into treating it as the premiss that some ideas are 
independent of (not owned by) my mind, and so infers that some mind has ideas 
when I do not. 
 
Yet on Winkler’s interpretation there is no mistake. The move from ideas “not caused by” 
my mind to ideas “not owned by” it is justified by appeal to a suppressed premise: DBA.20 
The ideas I have that I myself don’t cause must surely be caused by something, and of 
course on Berkeley’s ontology this something will be another mind. Yet with DBA in 
hand we must say that this mind too has ideas of what it causes.21 It is a point in favor of 
Winkler’s interpretation that it is able to save Berkeley from committing what Bennett 
sees as a rookie mistake.  
 Another strength of the DBA view is that it provides a unique and surprising 
                                                        
19 Winkler 96. 
20 Winkler 87. 
21 Winkler 88. 
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response to a worry many have had over Berkeley’s position that unperceived objects 
continue to exist in God’s mind. The concern, as Winkler puts it, is that the kind of 
existence Berkeley reserves for objects in God’s mind isn’t the 'first-class' kind of 
existence we typically expect of ordinary objects. In other words, existence in God’s mind 
doesn’t seem quite what we’re after when it comes to preserving our common sense 
intuitions about the unperceived. On Winkler’s interpretation, however, “archetypal 
existence” (the kind of existence reserved for objects in God’s mind) is not sufficient for 
real existence.22 Winkler argues that it isn’t explicit in the Principles or the Dialogues 
that Berkeley thinks archetypal existence should be enough to satisfy those with the 
above worry. Further, Winkler interprets Berkeley in such a way that ectypal existence is 
sufficient for real existence.23 He considers the possibility that for Berkeley, “the divine 
perception sufficient for existence is not mere intellection, but the perception which, 
according to DBA, must accompany every act of will.”24 The evidence for this feature of 
Winkler’s view is in Berkeley’s comments on the creation of the universe: 
 
HYLAS: What then are we to make of creation? 
PHILONOUS: May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite 
spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their 
existence, or be created, when God decreed they should become perceptible to 
intelligent creatures… You may call this a relative or hypothetical existence if you 
please.25  
 
and of course 
 
                                                        
22 Winkler 92. 
23 Winkler 95. 
24 Winkler 93. 
25 DHP §253. 
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PHILONOUS: What would you have! do I not acknowledge a two-fold state of 
things, the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The former 
was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God.26 
 
 The point Winkler makes  is one that can seem strange: for Berkeley, real 
existence is relative and ectypal. It turns out that the 'first-class' existence we were after 
was right in front of our noses, in the world of our perceptions. Real existence is relative 
to us on Berkeley’s schema, such that an object exists “if and only if God intends to cause 
certain ideas in the minds of finite spirits.”27 
 
Section Four: Objections 
 Stanley Tweyman objects to Winkler’s arguments, claiming that two of the 
passages he cites turn out not to support his thesis.28 The first is from the Principles: 
 
 A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being–as it perceives ideas it is called 
“the understanding,” and as it produces or otherwise operates upon them it is 
called “the will” (Tweyman’s emphasis).29 
 
Tweyman takes it that here Berkeley allows for idea formation without some precedent 
identical idea. That is, he allows for blind agency. A similar criticism is raised against 
another of Winkler’s passages: 
 
I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft 
as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in 
                                                        
26 DHP §254. 
27 Winkler 95. 
28 Stanley Tweyman, “Berkeley’s Denial of the Denial of Blind Agency,” Hermathena 139 (1985) 
145. 
29 PHK §27. 
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my fancy... This making and unmaking of ideas does very properly denominate 
the mind active (Tweyman’s emphasis).30 
 
Tweyman thinks that here Berkeley admits that experience reveals instances of willing 
that occur without a perception–though Tweyman takes care to note that Berkeley is 
silent as to how this kind of willing occurs.31 Tweyman goes on to draw attention to those 
passages in the dialogues where Philonous (Berkeley) criticizes the Malebranchean view 
Hylas considers: 
 
I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of your ideas, 
or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and 
power of God; and whether it does not derogate from those attributes to suppose 
He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to act, by an 
unthinking substance (Tweyman’s emphasis)?32 
 
and 
 
The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner exerted than executed, without the 
application of means, which, if they are employed by inferior agents, it is not 
upon account of any real efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce 
any effect, but merely in compliance with the laws of nature… prescribed… by the 
First Cause, who is Himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever 
(Tweyman’s emphasis).33 
 
What are we to make of this? The point Tweyman drives home is that for 
                                                        
30 PHK §28. 
31 Tweyman 146. 
32 DHP §220. 
33 DHP §219. 
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Berkeley, it is an axiom that God’s nature is such that God’s willing cannot be 
constrained at all. For Tweyman we have no choice but to make room for blind agency, 
even if we must resign ourselves to never knowing how it operates. If this seems 
unsatisfying, it might pacify the reader somewhat to recall that Berkeley takes himself to 
have cogent and novel arguments for God’s existence and nature, not to mention a 
broader philosophical system which is supposedly the sole safeguard of common sense. 
Considered in this context, it can seem clear that for Berkeley any other view on blind 
agency must lead to contradiction. If common sense is to be vindicated and skepticism 
dispatched, we must accept blind agency–or so things are for Tweyman’s Berkeley.  
There is another objection to Winkler’s position: it seems to generate an infinite 
regress. Recall that for Winkler’s Berkeley, God cannot will something without at least 
one perception 'behind' this willing. There must be a perceptual component to the 
volition which gives it its content.34 Recall as well, however, that all objects are supposed 
to have an eternal existence in God’s mind. Tweyman argues that this means God must 
then have perceptions 'behind' God’s volition to hold all objects in God’s mind, but these 
perceptions themselves must then be supported in God’s mind some other act of will... 
and so on. It can seem we must reject Winkler’s interpretation in favor of one which 
allows room for blind agency.  
 
Section Five: Objections Answered 
Tweyman’s arguments can seem compelling. Berkeley’s reference to the mind 
willing “as it produces” ideas, and his insistence than we imagine things by “no more 
than willing” appear straightforward enough. But there are subtleties Tweyman 
overlooks. For one, he argues that Berkeley’s axiom that God is unlimited requires he 
                                                        
34 Winkler 96. 
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endorse blind agency.35 Contra Tweyman however, it can be the case both that (1) God is 
unlimited, and (2) God’s acts of will involve perceptions. Perceptions are not an 
instrument by which God achieves his ends, and so do not limit the kinds of actions God 
may perform. Tweyman merely assumes that if God’s perception would limit God, in 
which case he would be justified in rejecting Winkler’s view. Instead he offers this line of 
reasoning: 
 
Premise 1: If the denial of blind agency thesis is true then either God requires an 
instrument to act, or else God is limited in some other way.  
Premise 2: It is neither the case that God requires an instrument to act, nor that 
God is limited in some other way. 
Conclusion: Therefore, the denial of blind agency thesis is incorrect. 
 
Is Premise 1 true? Recall that Winkler thinks it is a consequence of DBA that 
God’s will presupposes perception. Winkler uses the language of the will’s “involving” 
perception. The important point here is that on Winkler’s view the will and perception 
are not distinct. The will and perception are not discrete faculties–“cuts” in mind– but 
rather modes of it. Yet if the will and perception indeed arise mutually, then Tweyman is 
incorrect in his assertion that DBA limits what God might do. On Winkler’s view it is not 
that God cannot will a thing without a perception of it, but rather that to will a thing 
simply is to perceive it. If one wills a thing she perceives it, but if one perceives a thing 
she does not thereby will it (for one might be human). Perception is a constitutive 
element of the will, and as such an act of will that lacks a perception is a contradiction in 
terms. Insofar as an act of will is a particular act of will (that a particular thing occur), 
each act of will has its perception. To say that God wills a thing is to say that God is that 
                                                        
35 Tweyman 147. 
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thing’s cause; to say that God perceives a thing is to say that God wills that that thing be 
perceived by that human. The DBA view neither claims that perceptions are instruments 
by which God acts nor insists that God’s powers are limited, and so Premise 1 is false. 
There are more reasons to think Berkeley assumed DBA. For one, it seems hard 
to make sense of blind agency given how Berkeley defines minds and ideas. In the 
Principles, Berkeley defines minds in relation to ideas and vice versa: minds are that 
which perceives, and ideas are that which is perceived. Thus Berkeley says that in truth, 
we can have only a notion of spirit (or mind). Since given these definitions wherever a 
mind is, so are ideas, it seems that there is no conceptual space for blind agency on 
Berkeley’s schema. For Berkeley, whenever we hold an idea in our minds, we perceive. 
Thus it must be the case that Berkeley denies blind agency: a mind without perceptions 
is a contradiction in terms.  
What of the initial passages Tweyman emphasizes? Unfortunately they do not 
support a conclusion with the strength of the one he draws. Recall Tweyman’s emphasis 
on Berkeley’s remarks about the mind willing “as it produces” ideas, as well as his claim 
that we can imagine things by “no more than willing.” Let us take each of these in turn. 
 
A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being–as it perceives ideas it is called 
“the understanding,” and as it produces or otherwise operates upon them it is 
called “the will” (my emphasis).36 
 
Does this passage support the view that blind agency is possible? On the contrary, it 
suggests just the opposite. Berkeley’s claim here is that the mind (or spirit) is one, and 
that it is only when we speak of a particular aspect of the mind’s activity that for practical 
purposes we call that aspect “the understanding” or “the will.” This means that, as 
                                                        
36 PHK §27.  
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Winkler suggests, volition and perception are in truth one substance considered in 
different contexts. The passage Tweyman cites is not even intended to address the issue 
of whether volition is possible without perception. The same criticisms can be raised 
against the second passage Tweyman cites: 
 
I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft 
as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in 
my fancy… This making and unmaking of ideas does very properly denominate 
the mind active.37 
 
 Here again Berkeley’s comments only support Tweyman’s objections on a 
misreading of Winkler. Since on Winkler’s view to will is to perceive, to say that an 
idea arises in my fancy through “no more than willing” tells us little about whether 
blind agency is possible. It is premature to simply assume Berkeley’s “no more 
than” here means “without perceptual content” or “blind.”   
What then remains of Winkler’s proposal? God’s sovereignty isn’t threatened, 
and Tweyman’s criticisms of the passages Winkler provides prove harmless. But what of 
the final objection? Does Winkler’s interpretation generate an infinite regress? Tweyman 
supposes that if Winkler is correct God must will all of God’s perceptions to appear to 
God, this act of will must be prefaced by its own perception, and this perception must 
itself be produced by a separate act of God’s will. Tweyman overlooks the possibility 
however, that only each particular perception must be kept in God’s mind by an act of 
will, as opposed to the whole set’s needing to. But of course, the perception that 
accompanies each particular act of will is just the object of that act of will: its intentional 
content. Furthermore, Winkler is careful to note that “to deny blind agency is not to 
                                                        
37 PHK §28. 
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claim that a volition must always follow a perception or judgement in time, but merely to 
insist that volition, like perception and judgement themselves, is intentional.” Yet the 
objection exploits this very misunderstanding. Given Winkler’s claim here, as well as his 
premise that volition and perception arise mutually, Tweyman’s regress is forestalled.  
 
Section Six: Pain and Skepticism Reconsidered 
In the blind agency debate, Winkler’s interpretation of Berkeley proves the victor. 
This is less because there is room for response to Tweyman’s objections, and more 
because his arguments exploit what simply turn out to be misunderstandings of the 
position. Yet if we grant Winkler his thesis, what implications does this have for the 
issues explored at the outset: the problem of God’s pain and the skeptical worry which 
shadows it? 
 It will help to spell out some of the implications there are, given Winkler’s 
hypothesis, for the nature of God’s perceptions. On Winkler’s interpretation, “God 
certainly perceives all things, but his perception–insofar as it contributes to real 
existence–is nothing more than the perception inevitably involved in his volition.”38 
What this means is that contra what Winkler calls “the perception interpretation,” God’s 
perceiving an object is not sufficient for its continued existence, at least not when this 
perception is divorced from God’s willing ideas to appear in finite minds. It is not the 
case, despite appearances, that God keeps things in existence just by watching them.  
Is Winkler vulnerable to the skeptical worry? The dissimilarity between our 
perception and God’s has traditionally been the motivation for such a worry, most 
especially when it is employed as a safeguard against the pain problem. Winkler’s 
arguments, however, do not rely on an analogy between how we perceive and how God 
perceives. Winkler instead offers a deflationary conception of God’s perception as 
                                                        
38 Winkler 96. 
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“nothing more than the perception inevitably involved in his volition.”39  
A crucial feature of Winkler’s interpretation is that real existence is relative, and 
ectypal.40 The initial assumption driving the skeptical worry, that what God perceives 
provides the standard of reality, is thereby discarded. Rather, God’s perceptions provide 
the intentional content of God’s acts of will. The standard of reality is what humans 
perceive, and what humans perceive is willed by God.  
With this in hand we can counter the pain problem as originally presented, at 
least to a degree. Must God feel pain in order to know all things? Not at all. On Winkler’s 
interpretation, God’s 'perception' of pain is just the content of God’s willing that humans 
experience pain. God’s perception is what makes God’s acts of will intentional. This move 
no longer opens the door to skepticism given the ectypal nature of existence, and as such 
can serve as an adequate response to the pain problem. If Winkler is right, perception is 
a necessary feature of God’s willing something to occur (like my feeling pain). The 
motivation for thinking God’s impassivity limits God’ omniscience was that, in effect, to 
deny that God feels pain is to say that the objects of God’s perception and the objects of 
our own do not intersect.41 But with the denial of blind agency at our disposal we can say 
that–on the contrary–the object of God’s perception of pain and the object of our 
perception of pain are the same pain. The pain is merely willed on one end and felt on 
the other.  
Note, however, that this solution only shows that if the pain problem is a 
problem, it is not a problem because of Berkeley’s idealism. There are consequences 
however for his theism. So far however I endeavor only to show that in the case of the 
pain problem and the spectre of skepticism, Berkeley’s idealist commitments are not the 
                                                        
39 Winkler 96. 
40 Winkler 95. 
41 This is how the worry is characterized in Melissa Frankel, “Berkeley and God in the Quad,” 
Philosophy Compass 7 (2012): 391. 
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cause of the trouble. 
  
Section Seven: Concluding Remarks 
 The ways of addressing the pain problem explicit in the Dialogues engender a 
skepticism anathema to Berkeley. This skepticism undermines the motivation for taking 
on his idealist project in the first place. A detour into the blind agency debate reveals, 
however, that God’s will and perception are not distinct. The sense in which God 
'perceives' is the sense in which God’s willing that the world appear to us is intentional. 
There are no ideas in God’s mind to ground the standard of reality–at least not the sort 
which create a divide between the contents of God’s mind and those of our own. Rather, 
God’s acts of perception are concomitant with God’s acts of will. God’s perceptions are 
merely the contents of these acts. There is nothing more to reality beyond what we 
perceive–and our perceptions are God's symbols. Reality then is ectypal; the standard of 
reality is what humans perceive, and so the initial assumption driving the skeptical 
worry is undermined. God does not feel pain because God does not perceive as we do, 
but this leaves reality where it always was: right in front of our noses. 
 
PART TWO – GOD AND THE LAWS OF NATURE 
 
Section One: Considering God 
 I have tried to show that for Berkeley God's perception cannot be considered 
apart from God's will. Ontologically speaking the two are not distinct. God is after all a 
unity: "a being purely active." God's pure activity, when considered from an epistemic 
perspective (with regard to God’s knowledge) involves God's perception. God's 
perception just is God's knowledge, the intentional contents of God's acts of will–God is 
not blind. Indeed, there is nothing else for God to know beyond God's own activity, for 
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God's acts of will are made manifest in the laws of nature, which govern (indeed, are) the 
relations over the course of time and at any given time between minds and their ideas. In 
this way God can be said to both 'perceive' (insofar as God is aware of the content of 
God's intentions) and yet remain impassive, for God does not experience pain in the way 
we do (as receiving it), but rather as its Author (as willing that that pain occur).  
 There is more to say here. An appeal to God's nature as "purely active" in 
conjunction with an insistence that God is not blind does not clarify to the full the 
relationship between finite and divine ideas. Even if God's will 'just is' our (say) feeling 
pain, and God 'perceives' or knows that pain insofar as God's acts of will are intentional, 
we can still wonder about just what it means to say that God's nature is 'pure activity,' 
and about the specific nature of the intentional content of God's willing (say) that I feel 
pain. If, in the end, Berkeley's specific remarks about the nature of God's will (God's pure 
activity) simply regurgitate the pain problem et al., we are no better off than when we 
started. We must fill in the details of how God operates and what God's acts of will are 
before we can hope to lay to rest such problems by way of appeal to them.  
Even if Berkeley is able to dissolve the pain problem or associated problems by 
way of a more exacting analysis of God's activity, there is the lurking threat that his 
articulation of this analysis will mire him in heterodoxy. There are multiple hurdles to 
jump here: making God personal (avoiding conceptions like Spinoza's); giving God 
epistemic access to our perceptions (so as to render God omniscient); and yet keeping 
God immutable (perfect and unchanging). Given the importance of God's role in 
Berkeley's system, such theological quibbles have grave philosophical import. For 
Berkeley would be dissatisfied with a system which, however elegant, commits him to 
unusual theological claims (such as that God is an impersonal activity, or 'force,' or 
'nothing more' than the structure present in human experience–the laws of nature). Such 
a task can seem admittedly Herculean. I turn now to Berkeley's execution of this task. 
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Section Two - The Laws of Nature and "A Being Purely Active" 
 In interpreting Berkeley on the laws of nature (qua acts of God's will), there are 
two distinct perspectives to keep in mind: that (1) Berkeley's immaterialism must be 
preserved–that is, some ontological story underpinning the interpretation must be told–
and (2) Berkeley's analogical understanding of the laws of nature as a language must be 
preserved. The laws of nature must serve as the means of 'communication' between our 
minds and the mind of God. I take up these two interpretative tasks in turn. 
 I begin with Berkeley's immaterialism. How does Berkeley's ontology 'trickle up' 
into his understanding of the laws of nature and in the end the natural sciences? Here 
Berkeley must be compared with his historical context: a time when what Lisa Downing 
calls "dynamic realism" flourished. 
 According to Downing, Berkeley’s primary target in the Principles and the 
Dialogues is "materialist mechanism," the view on which (1) our perceptions are caused 
by material objects, (2) these objects are mind-independent, (3) these objects are 
composed of submicroscopic particles endowed with primary qualities (e.g. shape), and 
(4) our perceptions are comprised of secondary qualities (e.g. color) that do not 
represent or resemble the mind-independent primary qualities of objects. The 
materialist mechanist endeavor in science is thus to explain physical events solely in 
terms of the motions and interactions of these submicroscopic particles–and these in 
terms of the particles' primary qualities. Interestingly enough however, Downing argues 
that Berkeley’s views on the laws of nature are illumined by way of his De Motu, in which 
his target is much more focused. 
 Downing argues that although Berkeley rejects theses (1) through (4) above, he 
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may yet endorse the materialist mechanist endeavor in the natural sciences.42 The 
relevant question here of course is how this endeavor might be linked up to Berkeley’s 
immaterialist ontology. In just what sense is God active? What are God’s acts of will qua 
laws of nature? In what way are these laws God’s "language," and how are we to 
interpret it? The last of these questions I take up in the following sections. For now I will 
distill the most salient desiderata and consequences of interpreting Berkeley on the laws 
of nature out of the analysis Downing presents.  
 
Section Three - Finite Minds and the Will of God  
 When we interpret Berkeley's commitments here we must be clear at the outset 
about a critical point: there is no conceptual room on Berkeley's system for what I will 
call 'realism about motion.'43 Because my intention here is not to survey various theories 
of motion, I will define 'realism about motion' as simply any view that ascribes more 
than apparent causal power (and motive force specifically) to non-minds.  
There are two chief reasons, both of them conceptual, why Berkeley cannot 
endorse such a view. The first is by way of analysis of our perceptions and the bodies they 
form (this takes place primarily in the Principles and the Dialogues); the second is by 
way of analysis of realism about motion (in De Motu). For Berkeley realism about motion 
cannot possibly be true. Consider the following remarks he makes: 
 
"All those who [presume to] explain the cause and origin of motion [outside of a 
mind]… are to be considered as having said something rather than thought it… 
[they] either say nothing particular and determinate, or if there is anything in 
what they say, it will be as difficult to explain as that very thing it was brought 
                                                        
42 See Lisa Downing,  “Berkeley’ Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Science,” Cambridge 
Companion to Berkeley 236. 
43 Downing 241-2. 
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forward to explain..."44  
 
The significance of these remarks is ontological: the laws of nature and discoveries 
of the physical sciences may very well get at causes, but only insofar as they capture 
the structure of God's mental activity. Human beings' investigations in the natural 
sciences are thus their descrying the will of God. Further still, each present-
moment perception one has is God's will as expressed to human beings. While 
investigations in the natural sciences may offer us predictive power, or precisify 
descriptions of happenings in the natural world, one need go no further than what 
her eyes present to her right now to encounter the will of God. Insofar as Berkeley's 
conceptual arguments and fundamental ontology rule out any realism about 
motion, any and all apparent motion or causation we experience is God's 
communicating with us at that time. His symbols are our perceptions,; in this way 
the laws of nature constitute a language by which God communes with human 
minds continuously. 
 
Section Four: The Language of God  
Just what is it that is being communicated to finite minds by way of the laws of 
nature? What is it that God would wish us to know? The regularity by which our 
perceptions succeed one another allows us to experience ourselves as navigating within 
an orderly world in which predictions can be made and plans and intentions carried out–
a world in which choices have non-random consequences. The language of God–the laws 
of nature–establish the conditions on which human flourishing rests. In his New Theory 
of Vision, Berkeley illustrates this sense in which our perceptions constitute a language 
by way of analogy to a blind man: 
                                                        
44 DM §20. 
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 "Suppose one who had always continued blind be told by his guide that after he 
has advanced so many steps he shall come to the brink of a precipice, or be 
stopped by a wall; must not this to him seem very admirable and surprising? He 
cannot conceive how it is possible for mortals to frame such predictions as these, 
which to him would seem as strange and unaccountable as prophesy doth to 
others. Even they who are blessed with the visive faculty may (though familiarity 
make it less observed) find therein sufficient cause of admiration. The wonderful 
art and contrivance wherewith it is adjusted to those ends and purposes for which 
it was apparently designed, the vast extent, number, and variety of objects that 
are at once with so much ease and quickness and pleasure suggested by it: all 
these afford subject for much and pleasing speculation, and may, if anything, give 
us some glimmering analogous prænotion of things which are placed beyond the 
certain discovery and comprehension of our present state."45 
 
 There is a near-literal sense in which all human beings can be said to 
occupy the position of the blind man. All that is given to one at any moment is a 
heterogenous aggregate of perceptions, each of which cannot itself change or 
move. Apparent change is a substituting of one perception for another in the way 
a "motion picture" is a substituting of one frame for another. Yet the apparent 
motion and change in our perceptions is orderly, and this order is describable. 
The language of God, interpreted by humans, allows us to 'prophesy' over what 
will follow from our actions. God's language secures a place for the human 
pursuit of virtue. Even the human experience of pain and pleasure occurs in a 
lawlike fashion. Indeed, the "laws of pain and pleasure" may very well prove the 
most useful as an instrument by which we might discover the good. 
                                                        
45 NTV §148. 
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Section Five: God, Humans, and the Laws of Pain and Pleasure  
 
As I have shown, when we attempt to answer even a seemingly simple question 
like Does God feel pain? we have to dive into the details of how God's perception and will 
operate for Berkeley. I argued that the nature of God's perception is as Kenneth Winkler 
argues: God is not "blind"; to say God perceives a thing is just to identify the content of a 
particular act of God's will. I then turned to the nature of God's activity, arguing that the 
laws of nature constitute a language. Here at last I return to the original pain problem in 
discussion of the laws of pain and pleasure.  
Berkeley understands the laws of nature to capture 'full-blooded' motion or 
causation only in the form of God's motion or causation of human perceptions. The laws 
of pain and pleasure then are just those regularities by which humans experience pain 
and pleasure over the course of their lives. Berkeley mentions laws of pain and pleasure 
in the context of discussing "the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole [of 
natural law]"46 which serves as "the strongest incentive to virtue, and the best guard 
against vice." This, and the fact that he says the laws of pain and pleasure are "never-
enough-admired,"47 suggest that Berkeley thinks these laws are exceptional in their 
contribution to human flourishing. God thus does not feel pain; God wills our pains. Yet 
a pain-free God is not ipso facto impersonal. 
Recall that for causes to have their effects in any genuine sense it must be as the 
willing of a mind. This then is the sense in which God is personal: he moves the sun and 
the stars. Insofar as God is personal in this way, the desideratum of orthodoxy is 
preserved. The cost, however, is that in the strictest sense God does not feel anything, 
                                                        
46 PHK §146. 
47 PHK §146. 
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and thus cannot know the passions in the way that we do. But this was guaranteed from 
the outset in virtue of the conceptual points Berkeley makes anyway; God is a being 
purely active, and so God's knowledge and experience of pain is as the ground of "the 
laws of pain and pleasure" and their role in a greater structure of laws according to which 
human actions have consequences in non-random fashion.  
 
Section Six: Concluding Remarks  
 
By way of refuting what I have called 'realism about motion' Berkeley is able to 
establish that human beings' investigations in the natural sciences are their descrying the 
will of God. Insofar as God's will is made manifest to us by way of the laws of nature–
perhaps especially in the case of "the laws of pain and pleasure"–human beings are in a 
position to discover ever more concerning their well-being and the path to virtue. Again, 
however, we must not read this as a mere changing of the words of materialist 
mechanists. Neither bodies nor ideas 'move'–God's will is the cause of all but our own 
volitions. God's will is even a partial cause of the effects of our volitions, or at least the 
lawlike fashion in which these effects arise. God 'speaks' to humanity via willing what 
ideas they encounter when, and how these ideas are related to their others. Even in the 
dull throb one feels when she stubs her toe, God is communicating something about how 
one should live her life (even if this something is only that one should be more mindful of 
her surroundings).  
I will re-emphasize the point that Berkeley's God is nevertheless personal, 
despite God's communicating with humans only in natural law. Berkeley's God is 
impassive and immutable, and does not for instance "hate all who do wrong and destroy 
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those who tell lies," strictly speaking.48 For Berkeley's God does not perceive (as we do), 
and so cannot feel: God is not affected 'from the outside.' Nevertheless, Berkeley's God is 
intimately personal. Indeed, Berkeley's God relates to us far more directly than God 
might on an alternative picture: for on Berkeley's system God communicates with 
humankind every moment in every way in which we are affected from the outside. This 
is not quite heterodoxy; this is rather a more principled understanding of orthodoxy.  
Still, there is a significant sense in which the utterances of the vulgar that God 
"laughs at the wicked" and "feels indignation every day," for instance, are quite false.49 If 
God offers us rewards or punishments in this life, or answers prayers, it is only by way of 
the laws of nature, by way of the order according to which our choices have their 
consequences. Yet Berkeley is not left with some fully-automated Prime Mover, for 
motion and causation themselves can only be understood as the activity of a mind. God's 
mind is indeed very different than our own, but in a way which brings the contents of 
God's mind closer within our reach. God's will is made plain–insofar as it can be to 
humans–right here and now in the playing out of their present-moment perceptions.  
 
PART THREE – BERKELEY AND HIS GOD 
 
Section One: Starting with God 
Berkeley's system and arguments are ingenious: his idealism is not easily 
matched in elegance of presentation and manoeuvrability. Yet like so many, Berkeley's 
reach exceeds his grasp; his passion to preserve orthodoxy whatever the cost generates, 
after fisticuffs, questions that at the end of the day are likely unanswerable. Can the 
essentially infinite know the essentially finite? Can an essentially non-sensory being 
                                                        
48 As God is described in Psalm 5:5-6. 
49 From Psalm 37:13 and 7:11 respectively. 
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perceive what I do? Can a non-sensory being perceive at all? Here and there, 
interpretations offer their replies. But none are the sort which serve Berkeley's 
theological agenda. The fundamental principles to which he is committed do not allow 
for any fog wherein the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob might reside. Berkeley's own 
insistence on clarity of ideas and of inference, the very perceptiveness by which he has 
been inducted into the canon, dig the grave of just this God.  
 And yet, Stephen Daniel interprets Berkeley in a way which resolves more than 
one of the problems at hand–and quite dazzlingly–by appeal to more explicitly 
theological concerns. Daniel extrapolates from Christian Neoplatonic principles (which 
he argues influenced Berkeley to a considerable degree) an understanding of Berkeley's 
God that presumes to dissolve all difficulty.50 I consider his interpretation worth 
examining insofar as it serves as a straightforward example of what I take to be the 
tension at the heart of Berkeley's system: that when it comes to ontological artistry and 
robust theological orthodoxy, something has got to give.  
Daniel begins his analysis by highlighting the most salient goals in interpreting 
Berkeley's ontology. The first (as is perhaps obvious) is to have in hand by the end of the 
procedure a personal God–a God with a mind like ours.51 Daniel takes this aim rather 
seriously, insofar as God's relational nature establishes the rock-bottom ontological 
primitive from which his interpretation is constructed. An oft-lauded facet of Christianity 
is that it offers us a God who is intimately personal, who loves sinners and hates sin, who 
comforts the righteous and bemoans the wicked. God's triune nature after all is supposed 
to provide human beings with an image of themselves: creatures defined in their 
essential nature in terms of their relations to one another and to the Divine. God is thus 
cast as a Mystery made manifest by way of three distinct personae: the Father, the Son, 
                                                        
50 See Stephen Daniel, "Berkeley's Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine Ideas," 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 240. 
51 Ibid. 
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and the Holy Ghost. These are the ontological building blocks with which Daniel begins. 
 
Section Two – The Trinity as a Model for Mind 
 
 For Daniel the relations that obtain between the three persons of the Trinity 
ground and mirror the relations that obtain between finite minds, their ideas, and God. 
Insofar as the God of Christianity is a unity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost 
cannot be conceived apart from each other. God just is this Trinity, and each of its 
members has its nature in virtue of its participating in relationships with the other two. 
Daniel argues that finite minds are related to their ideas and to God in just such a way. 
Finite minds are God's acts of will made manifest by way of sensible ideas. Ideas require 
a mind to receive them, but more significantly God's acts of will require ideas and finite 
minds to be realized.  
Finite minds and their ideas arise in coordination with God's acts of will. The 
minds of God and humans meet in the actual world. Thus the upshot of Daniel's 
interpretation for the nature of God's ideas is that God's ideas are identical to our own. 
Our ideas are God's medium. This is good news so far as the sameness and continuity of 
everyday 'objects' are concerned. The consequence is worse for God's feeling pain. While 
Daniel does not speak to the second issue, it seems to me there are only two ways of 
moving forward. The first is to say that God does indeed feel pain; God's ideas are 
robustly identical to our own. Berkeley's victory here would be bittersweet, tinged with a 
distasteful heterodoxy–the "Divine Being" demoted to a suffering demi-god. The second 
route is to say that God cannot feel pain, because God does not sense; our pain is 
reflected back to God by way of God's pure intellection. Yet knowledge of pain so purified 
can seem false knowledge of what pain is. Is not the nature of pain that it feel the way it 
does to us? This especially given Daniel's ontological assumptions. Can pain abstracted 
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from its real-world relations to finite minds even have a nature for Daniel? A God of pure 
intellection hardly seems like a God who might love and hate in the way Daniel insists 
God must for Berkeley. 
These consequences illustrate what is at stake with the second of Daniel's listed 
desiderata: that God not be rendered "blind."52 A blind God–a God without full-blooded 
perceptions–has already been shown to be troublesome. Indeed, the very need to avoid 
such a God endows the questions above with bite. Just how is it that God might remain 
impassive, given God must perceive? I have argued that the best move is to appeal to 
God's nature as "a being purely active." This what Daniel does, but in the most 
bewildering of ways.  
 
Section Three – A Being Purely Active 
 
 According to Daniel, Berkeley's God is active in virtue of God's personal nature as 
borne out in the Trinity. Daniel claims that "God cannot subsist without knowing and 
acting." Without diving into too much detail, we can see how a specifically Neoplatonic 
Trinitarianism implies this. To Christian Neoplatonists, God is a substance which has its 
being in three hypostases or states of activity. These states of activity are stamped in the 
nature of all beings, insofar as all creatures partake in the nature of their Creator.53 While 
these three states are in the end acknowledged to be the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost of 
traditional Christian theology, philosophically speaking the three hypostases are 
identified as the principles of "Being," "Mind/Logos," and "Life," respectively.54 The 
perhaps exotic metaphysics is significant insofar as it contributes, Daniel argues, to an 
understanding of why Berkeley characterizes God, finite minds, and the relationship 
                                                        
52 Daniel 245. 
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between the two in the way he does. For instance, the Christian Trinity is supposed on 
this reading to consist of three states of activity, neither substances nor distinct centers 
of consciousness lying somewhere 'behind' or 'beneath' their intercommunication. The 
perennial commingling of the Trinity–its internal relations–define its contours and 
constitute its nature. Its nature is Its structure. Finite minds mirror this triadic structure 
by being related to their ideas and to God's acts of will such that none can exist or have 
its nature without the relations they in fact bear to one another in the actual world. It is 
difficult to overstate the point: on Daniel's picture, our minds just are the real-world 
relationships that arise between our experienced succession of ideas and God's acts of 
will, the laws of nature. The total network of divinely decreed relations between finite 
minds, ideas, and God's volitional activity makes up the nature of three seemingly 
'distinct' classes of entity. Daniel sees evidence of this in Berkeley's remark that "will and 
understanding [or perception] constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit" (D 240, 
emphasis mine). Daniel argues that Berkeley is trying the best he can in the terms 
available to him to articulate a fundamental difference between his system and those of, 
for instance, Descartes and Locke. For Berkeley 'a mind' is not a substance or 'a thing,' 
but rather an activity and its relations to other activities.55 By way of this perhaps radical 
approach, Daniel takes himself to have both grounded the sameness and continuity of 
objects and streamlined the structure of the relationship between human minds and the 
Divine Mind. He captures his strategy by saying that "for God to know and act is imply 
for God to be, just as for any created being to know and act if for God to be. In this sense, 
'God alone exists.'" 
Here, however, Daniel lets too many cats out of the bag. In overemphasizing his 
point he draws attention to looming trouble: just why is it, one wonders, that it isn't the 
case in a robust sense that 'God alone exists,' for Berkeley? If the Trinity is all we start 
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with, it is hard to see how we might end up with anything else.  
 
Section Four: Reaching for God  
 
This detour into Daniel's interpretation and his admittedly startling theo-
metaphysical considerations is meant to show that there are those who would wish to 
interpret Berkeley as (and themselves accomplish) a safeguarding of the metaphors of 
"the vulgar". I have argued that Berkeley is too systematic, his principles too stringent, to 
allow for this. Just this kind of personality in God is what is not preserved on my 
interpretation. Daniel's interpretation embodies perfectly the tension between 
ontological artistry on the part of Berkeley or interpreter, and orthodoxy literally taken 
on the part of "the vulgar." Berkeley's concern for the intuitions of the common-man is 
what it is only insofar as these are derived from, represent, or align with rigorous and 
principled philosophizing. But this concern will not have him licensing metaphorical 
utterances like those presented. The commitments of Berkeley's that I have examined 
here show that one should not read Berkeley as a simple case of Christian apologetics 
gone horribly wrong. He is far more ambitious. 
 
PART FOUR – CONCLUSION 
 I began with a singular interpretive puzzle: Does Berkeley's God feel pain? Very 
quickly it became clear that any answer generates further difficulties. What are God's 
perceptions? What are God's acts of will? I took up each of these questions in turn. I 
argued that Berkeley's God is not "blind"; Berkeley's God perceives. Yet Berkeley's God 
does not perceive as we do: while our perceptions come to us by way of the senses, God's 
'perceptions' are just the intentional contents of God's acts of will. What it means to say 
that God perceives my feeling pain is that God wills that that pain occur to me. God's will 
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does the work of bringing things into existence, while to say that God perceives these 
things is just to say that God wills that these things appear to the minds to which they in 
fact appear.  
I argue that for Berkeley God's acts of will are the laws of nature, and as such God 
is the cause of the motion and causality apparent in our perceptions. Individual human 
beings' perceptions–and perhaps especially their experience of "the laws of pain and 
pleasure"–are thus the symbols by which God communicates with human minds. In just 
this sense the laws of nature constitute God's 'language.' The orderliness by which 
human beings experience the world establishes and grants them access to facts 
concerning their flourishing.  
The upshot of these analyses is that God does not feel pain, and saying so does 
not land Berkeley in a mire of skepticism on the one hand or heterodoxy on the other. 
Berkeley is able to preserve both (1) God's immutability, (2) the intimacy of God's 
relation to human minds, and (3) reality's not lying on the other side of some 'veil of 
perception.'  
Indeed, by way of his understanding of the laws of nature as a language, Berkeley 
has a way to render God more personal than certain other conceptions we might call to 
mind. Berkeley is able to dissolve the pain problem, since God does not perceive 
passively as we do. What it means to say God perceives is just that God's acts of will are 
intentional. Yet God is not thereby placed across some skeptical chasm. God's acts of will 
contain their content in virtue of and are of necessity made manifest in each human 
being's perceptions. The 'real world' is our world: the contents of God's mind are simply 
made plain to human beings by way of what we experience as the laws of nature. Of 
course, God does not occupy the same perspective with respect to God's own mind: God 
is a being purely active. Thus God is not an impersonal 'force of nature,' but a personal 
mind which continuously communicates by way of symbols, namely human perceptions. 
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Insofar as human beings are passive, this is how we must be communicated to.  
 There is a cost to my interpretation. There is no way for Berkeley to literally 
vindicate the utterances of the "vulgar": talk of God's feeling pain, delighting in 
righteousness, or grieving over wickedness is at best metaphorical and at worst 
misleading. Strictly speaking the only contents of God's mind are God's perceptions and 
God's acts of will, and neither class of contents might contain such attitudes. Either God 
delights and grieves–and feels pain–or God does none of the three. Other ways of 
interpreting Berkeley may offer solutions to one or more of the discussed problems, but 
they cannot simultaneously accommodate his other commitments concerning the nature 
of God's perception, will, and 'language.' This consequence illustrates the importance of 
getting clear on the internal structure of Berkeley's system, so as not to take him for an 
apologist bending over backwards to safeguard “vulgar” metaphor.  
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